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cloud_zhou - 2008/7/27 15:14:00
Holding the Center of a Mountain Fortress By George Friedman Tounderstand Iran, you must begin by understanding how large it is. Iranis the 17th largest country in world. It measures 1,684,000 squarekilometers. That means that its territory is larger than the combinedterritories of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain andPortugal - Western Europe. Iran is the 16th most populous country inthe world, with about 70 million people. Its population is larger thanthe populations of either France or the United Kingdom. Underthe current circumstances, it might be useful to benchmark Iran againstIraq or Afghanistan. Iraq is 433,000 square kilometers, with about 25million people, so Iran is roughly four times as large and three timesas populous. Afghanistan is about 652,000 square kilometers, with apopulation of about 30 million. One way to look at it is that Iran is68 percent larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined, with 40 percentmore population. More important are its topographical barriers.Iran is defined, above all, by its mountains, which form its frontiers,enfold its cities and describe its historical heartland. To understandIran, you must understand not only how large it is but also howmountainous it is. Iran's most important mountains are the Zagros. They are a southernextension of the Caucasus, running about 900 miles from thenorthwestern border of Iran, which adjoins Turkey and Armenia,southeast toward Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz. The first 150miles of Iran's western border is shared with Turkey. It is intenselymountainous on both sides. South of Turkey, the mountains on thewestern side of the border begin to diminish until they disappearaltogether on the Iraqi side. From this point onward, south of theKurdish regions, the land on the Iraqi side is increasingly flat, partof the Tigris-Euphrates basin. The Iranian side of the border ismountainous, beginning just a few miles east of the border. Iran has amountainous border with Turkey, but mountains face a flat plain alongthe Iraq border. This is the historical frontier between Persia - thename of Iran until the early 20th century - and Mesopotamia ("landbetween two rivers"), as southern Iraq is called. The one regionof the western border that does not adhere to this model is in theextreme south, in the swamps where the Tigris and Euphrates rivers jointo form the Shatt al-Arab waterway. There the Zagros swing southeast,and the southern border between Iran and Iraq zigzags south to theShatt al-Arab, which flows south 125 miles through flat terrain to thePersian Gulf. To the east is the Iranian province of Khuzestan,populated by ethnic Arabs, not Persians. Given the swampy nature of theground, it can be easily defended and gives Iran a buffer against anyforce from the west seeking to move along the coastal plain of Iran onthe Persian Gulf. Running east along the Caspian Sea are theElburz Mountains, which serve as a mountain bridge between theCaucasus-Zagros range and Afghan mountains that eventually culminate inthe Hindu Kush. The Elburz run along the southern coast of the Caspianto the Afghan border, buffering the Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan.Mountains of lesser elevations then swing down along the Afghan andPakistani borders, almost to the Arabian Sea. Iran has about800 miles of coastline, roughly half along the eastern shore of thePersian Gulf, the rest along the Gulf of Oman. Its most important port,Bandar Abbas, is located on the Strait of Hormuz. There are noequivalent ports along the Gulf of Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz isextremely vulnerable to interdiction. Therefore, Iran is not a majormaritime or naval power. It is and always has been a land power. Thecenter of Iran consists of two desert plateaus that are virtuallyuninhabited and uninhabitable. These are the Dasht-e Kavir, whichstretches from Qom in the northwest nearly to the Afghan border, andthe Dasht-e Lut, which extends south to Balochistan. The Dasht-e Kavirconsists of a layer of salt covering thick mud, and it is easy to breakthrough the salt layer and drown in the mud. It is one of the mostmiserable places on earth. Iran's population is concentrated in its mountains, not in itslowlands, as with other countries. That's because its lowlands, withthe exception of the southwest and the southeast (regions populated bynon-Persians), are uninhabitable. Iran is a nation of 70 millionmountain dwellers. Even its biggest city, Tehran, is in the foothillsof towering mountains. Its population is in a belt stretching throughthe Zagros and Elbroz mountains on a line running from the easternshore of the Caspian to the Strait of Hormuz. There is a secondaryconcentration of people to the northeast, centered on Mashhad. The restof the country is lightly inhabited and almost impassable because ofthe salt-mud flats. If you look carefully at a map of Iran,you can see that the western part of the country - the Zagros Mountains- is actually a land bridge for southern Asia. It is the only pathbetween the Persian Gulf in the south and the Caspian Sea in the north.Iran is the route connecting the Indian subcontinent to theMediterranean Sea. But because of its size and geography, Iran is not acountry that can be easily traversed, much less conquered. Thelocation of Iran's oil fields is critical here, since oil remains itsmost important and most strategic export. Oil is to be found in threelocations: The southwest is the major region, with lesser depositsalong the Iraqi border in the north and one near Qom. The southwesternoil fields are an extension of the geological formation that createdthe oil fields in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Hence, theregion east of the Shatt al-Arab is of critical importance to Iran.Iran has the third largest oil reserves in the world and is the world'sfourth largest producer. Therefore, one would expect it to be one ofthe wealthiest countries in the world. It isn't. Iran has the 28th largest economy in the world but ranks only 71st inper capita gross domestic product (as expressed in purchasing power).It ranks with countries like Belarus or Panama. Part of the reason isinefficiencies in the Iranian oil industry, the result of governmentpolicies. But there is a deeper geographic problem. Iran has a hugepopulation mostly located in rugged mountains. Mountainous regions arerarely prosperous. The cost of transportation makes the development ofindustry difficult. Sparsely populated mountain regions are generallypoor. Heavily populated mountain regions, when they exist, are muchpoorer. Iran's geography and large population make substantialimprovements in its economic life difficult. Unlike underpopulated andless geographically challenged countries such as Saudi Arabia andKuwait, Iran cannot enjoy any shift in the underlying weakness of itseconomy brought on by higher oil prices and more production. Theabsence of inhabitable plains means that any industrial plant mustdevelop in regions where the cost of infrastructure tends to underminethe benefits. Oil keeps Iran from sinking even deeper, but it alonecannot catapult Iran out of its condition. The Broad Outline Iranis a fortress. Surrounded on three sides by mountains and on the fourthby the ocean, with a wasteland at its center, Iran is extremelydifficult to conquer. This was achieved once by the Mongols, whoentered the country from the northeast. The Ottomans penetrated theZagros Mountains and went northeast as far as the Caspian but made noattempt to move into the Persian heartland. Iran is a mountainous country looking for inhabitable plains. There arenone to the north, only more mountains and desert, or to the east,where Afghanistan's infrastructure is no more inviting. To the souththere is only ocean. What plains there are in the region lie to thewest, in modern-day Iraq and historical Mesopotamia and Babylon. IfIran could dominate these plains, and combine them with its ownpopulation, they would be the foundation of Iranian power. Indeed,these plains were the foundation of the Persian Empire. The Persiansoriginated in the Zagros Mountains as a warrior people. They built anempire by conquering the plains in the Tigris and Euphrates basin. Theydid this slowly, over an extended period at a time when there were nodemarcated borders and they faced little resistance to the west. Whileit was difficult for a lowland people to attack through mountains, itwas easier for a mountain-based people to descend to the plains. Thiscombination of population and fertile plains allowed the Persians toexpand. Iran's attacking north or northwest into the Caucasusis impossible in force. The Russians, Turks and Iranians all ground toa halt along the current line in the 19th century; the country is sorugged that movement could be measured in yards rather than miles. Irancould attack northeast into Turkmenistan, but the land there is flatand brutal desert. The Iranians could move east into Afghanistan, butthis would involve more mountain fighting for land of equallyquestionable value. Attacking west, into the Tigris and Euphrates riverbasin, and then moving to the Mediterranean, would seem doable. Thiswas the path the Persians took when they created their empire andpushed all the way to Greece and Egypt. In terms of expansion, the problem for Iran is its mountains. They areas effective a container as they are a defensive bulwark. Supporting anattacking force requires logistics, and pushing supplies through theZagros in any great numbers is impossible. Unless the Persians canoccupy and exploit Iraq, further expansion is impossible. In order toexploit Iraq, Iran needs a high degree of active cooperation fromIraqis. Otherwise, rather than converting Iraq's wealth into politicaland military power, the Iranians would succeed only in being boggeddown in pacifying the Iraqis. In order to move west, Iranwould require the active cooperation of conquered nations. Anyoffensive will break down because of the challenges posed by themountains in moving supplies. This is why the Persians created the typeof empire they did. They allowed conquered nations a great deal ofautonomy, respected their culture and made certain that these nationsbenefited from the Persian imperial system. Once they left the Zagros,the Persians could not afford to pacify an empire. They needed thewealth at minimal cost. And this has been the limit on Persian/Iranianpower ever since. Recreating a relationship with the inhabitants of theTigris and Euphrates basin - today's Iraq - is enormously difficult.Indeed, throughout most of history, the domination of the plains byIran has been impossible. Other imperial powers - Alexandrian Greece,Rome, the Byzantines, Ottomans, British and Americans - have eitherseized the plains themselves or used them as a neutral buffer againstthe Persians. Underlying the external problems of Iran is a severe internal problem.Mountains allow nations to protect themselves. Completely eradicating aculture is difficult. Therefore, most mountain regions of the worldcontain large numbers of national and ethnic groups that retain theirown characteristics. This is commonplace in all mountainous regions.These groups resist absorption and annihilation. Although a Muslimstate with a population that is 55 to 60 percent ethnically Persian,Iran is divided into a large number of ethnic groups. It is alsodivided between the vastly dominant Shia and the minority Sunnis, whoare clustered in three areas of the country - the northeast, thenorthwest and the southeast. Any foreign power interested in Iran willuse these ethnoreligious groups to create allies in Iran to underminethe power of the central government. Thus, any Persian orIranian government has as its first and primary strategic interestmaintaining the internal integrity of the country against separatistgroups. It is inevitable, therefore, for Iran to have a highlycentralized government with an extremely strong security apparatus. Formany countries, holding together its ethnic groups is important. ForIran it is essential because it has no room to retreat from its currentlines and instability could undermine its entire security structure.Therefore, the Iranian central government will always face the problemof internal cohesion and will use its army and security forces for thatpurpose before any other.
cloud_zhou - 2008/7/27 15:15:00
Geopolitical Imperatives For most countries, the firstgeographical imperative is to maintain internal cohesion. For Iran, itis to maintain secure borders, then secure the country internally.Without secure borders, Iran would be vulnerable to foreign powers thatwould continually try to manipulate its internal dynamics, destabilizeits ruling regime and then exploit the resulting openings. Iran mustfirst define the container and then control what it contains.Therefore, Iran's geopolitical imperatives: Iranhas achieved four of the five basic goals. It has created securefrontiers and is in control of the population inside the country. Thegreatest threat against Iran is the one it has faced since Alexanderthe Great - that posed by major powers outside the region.Historically, before deep-water navigation, Iran was the direct path toIndia for any Western power. In modern times, the Zagros remain theeastern anchor of Turkish power. Northern Iran blocks Russianexpansion. And, of course, Iranian oil reserves make Iran attractive tocontemporary great powers. There are two traditional pathsinto Iran. The northeastern region is vulnerable to Central Asianpowers while the western approach is the most-often used (orattempted). A direct assault through the Zagros Mountains is notfeasible, as Saddam Hussein discovered in 1980. However, manipulatingthe ethnic groups inside Iran is possible. The British, for example,based in Iraq, were able to manipulate internal political divisions inIran, as did the Soviets, to the point that Iran virtually lost itsnational sovereignty during World War II. The greatest threatto Iran in recent centuries has been a foreign power dominating Iraq-Ottoman or British - and extending its power eastward not through mainforce but through subversion and political manipulation. The view ofthe contemporary Iranian government toward the United States is that,during the 1950s, it assumed Britain's role of using its position inIraq to manipulate Iranian politics and elevate the shah to power. The1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq was a terrific collision of twostates, causing several million casualties on both sides. It alsodemonstrated two realities. The first is that a determined, well-funded, no-holds-barred assault from Mesopotamia against the ZagrosMountains will fail (albeit at an atrocious cost to the defender). Thesecond is that, in the nation-state era, with fixed borders andstanding armies, the logistical challenges posed by the Zagros make amajor attack from Iran into Iraq equally impossible. There is astalemate on that front. Nevertheless, from the Iranian point of view,the primary danger of Iraq is not direct attack but subversion. It isnot only Iraq that worries them. Historically, Iranians also have beenconcerned about Russian manipulation and manipulation by the Britishand Russians through Afghanistan. The Current Situation Forthe Iranians, the current situation has posed a dangerous scenariosimilar to what they faced from the British early in the 20th century.The United States has occupied, or at least placed substantial forces,to the east and the west of Iran, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is notconcerned about these troops invading Iran. That is not a militarypossibility. Iran's concern is that the United States will use thesepositions as platforms to foment ethnic dissent in Iran. Indeed,the United States has tried to do this in several regions. In thesoutheast, in Balochistan, the Americans have supported separatistmovements. It has also done this among the Arabs of Khuzestan, at thenorthern end of the Persian Gulf. And it has tried to manipulate theKurds in northwestern Iran. (There is some evidence to suggest that theUnited States has used Azerbaijan as a launchpad to foment dissentamong the Iranian Azeris in the northwestern part of the country.) The Iranian counter to all this has several dimensions: The heart of Iranian strategy is as it hasalways been, to use the mountains as a fortress. So long as it isanchored in those mountains, it cannot be invaded. Alexander succeededand the Ottomans had limited success (little more than breaching theZagros), but even the Romans and British did not go so far as to try touse main force in the region. Invading and occupying Iran is not anoption. For Iran, its ultimate problem is internal tensions.But even these are under control, primarily because of Iran's securitysystem. Ever since the founding of the Persian Empire, the one thingthat Iranians have been superb at is creating systems that both benefitother ethnic groups and punish them if they stray. That same mindsetfunctions in Iran today in the powerful Ministry of Intelligence andSecurity and the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). (TheIranian military is configured mainly as an infantry force, with theregular army and IRGC ground forces together totaling about 450,000troops, larger than all other service branches combined.) Iranis, therefore, a self-contained entity. It is relatively poor, but ithas superbly defensible borders and a disciplined central governmentwith an excellent intelligence and internal security apparatus. Iranuses these same strengths to destabilize the American position (or thatof any extraregional power) around it. Indeed, Iran is sufficientlysecure that the positions of surrounding countries are more precariousthan that of Iran. Iran is superb at low-cost, low- risk powerprojection using its covert capabilities. It is even better at blockingthose of others. So long as the mountains are in Iranian hands, and theinternal situation is controlled, Iran is a stable state, but one ableto pose only a limited external threat. The creation of anIranian nuclear program serves two functions. First, if successful, itfurther deters external threats. Second, simply having the programenhances Iranian power. Since the consequences of a strike againstthese facilities are uncertain and raise the possibility of Iranianattempts at interdiction of oil from the Persian Gulf, the strategicrisk to the attacker's economy discourages attack. The diplomatic routeof trading the program for regional safety and power becomes moreattractive than an attack against a potential threat in a country witha potent potential counter. Iran is secure from conceivableinvasion. It enhances this security by using two tactics. First, itcreates uncertainty as to whether it has an offensive nuclearcapability. Second, it projects a carefully honed image of ideologicalextremism that makes it appear unpredictable. It makes itself appearthreatening and unstable. Paradoxically, this increases the cautionused in dealing with it because the main option, an air attack, hashistorically been ineffective without a follow-on ground attack. Ifjust nuclear facilities are attacked and the attack fails, Iranianreaction is unpredictable and potentially disproportionate. Iranianposturing enhances the uncertainty. The threat of an air attack isdeterred by Iran's threat of an attack against sea-lanes. Such attackswould not be effective, but even a low-probability disruption of theworld's oil supply is a risk not worth taking. As always, thePersians face a major power prowling at the edges of their mountains.The mountains will protect them from main force but not from the threatof destabilization. Therefore, the Persians bind their nation togetherthrough a combination of political accommodation and repression. Themajor power will eventually leave. Persia will remain so long as itsmountains stand.
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